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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Dennis Sherman Kinder, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
--------
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 9778 
-·--··- ·---
STATE11ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a criminal action in which 
the defendant was charged with robbery 
and grand larceny. Both charges arose 
out of the same occurrence ~mich took 
place on October 30, 1961, at the Al 
Harris Dairy Milk Depot in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOHER COURT 
The case \•Tas tried to a jury. From 
-1-
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a vereict and jugment of guilty of rob-
bery and grand larceny, defendant 
appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks reversal of 
the judgment and a new trial. 
STATENENT OF FACTS 
On October 30, 1961, at about 8 
P.M. an armed robber entered the Al Harris 
Dairy Hilk Depot in Salt Lake City) Utah, 
and robbed Daniel L. Kelly, an employee, 
of $156.83 * The money belonged to the 
dairy company and was taken from the cash 
register. The robber wore a red bandana 
around the top of his head and had three. 
or four days growth of beard on his face. 
After he departed, the police ~1ere called 
and made a routine investigation. During 
this investigation, Mr. Kelly identified 
a photograph of another person as being 
the robber, but later changed his mind 
-2-
" 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and identified a photograph of the defend-
ant as the perpetrator of the crime. 
During the trial of the case, Mr. 
Kelly identified the defendant as the 
person who took the money from him. Upon 
cross-examination, however, counsel 
brought out that the identification "~:·vas 
somewhat doubtful. 
The defendant took the stand at 
the trial and testified that he was in 
Arizona at the time the crime was committed. 
On crone-examination, the prosecutor 1\•Jas 
permitted, over oounsel 1 s .objections, to 
bring out certain testimony about facts 
vJhich vJere not mentioned on direct exam-
ation. This testimony was about a 195.5 
Ford pick-up truck in 1V'7hich the defendant 
drove to Arizona. The prosecutor was 
allo~d to elicit facts about where the 
defendant obtained the truck and about 
certain changes that he made in the truck 
-3-
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before he left for Arizona. The State 
was later allowed by the court to show 
that the defendant had previously told a 
policeman a different story abcut the 
truck than what he told in court on the 
day of the trial. 
After the crime was commit ted, the 
witness, Daniel Kelly)' who vJas on parole 
from the Utah State Prison, v1as returned 
to the prison for parole violation. ~~~Jhen 
the defendant was convicted, he was com-
mitted to the Utah State Prison for pun-
ishment. After he arrived at the prison, 
he talked to Mr. Kelly about the case and 
obtained an affidavit from him to the 
effect that the defendant was not the 
pen::·1 v1ho had robbed him. He also 
obtained an affidavit from Charles Glenis 
Anderson, another prisoner, who S"~;·Jears 
therein that Daniel Kelly told him the 
person WQO committed the crime had paid 
-4-
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him to testify at the trial. 
ARGilliJENT 
Point l. SINCE THE TRIAL OF THE CASE, 
THE DEFENDANT HAS DISCOVERED NEl.Y EVIDENCE 
\ffiiCH IS lliATERIAL TO HIS C11SE AND TO THE 
COURT AND UHICH HE COULD NOT, \rJI'IHOUT 
REASONABLE DILIGENCE, HAVE DISCOVERED 
PRIOR TO THE TRIAL OR PRODUCED AT THE 
TIME OF THE TRIAL. 
After the defendant v1as commit ted to 
the Utah State Prison for punishment, he 
talked to the witness, Daniel Kelly, vJho 
had been returned to the prison for parole 
violation between the time of the alleged 
robbery and the trial of the case. After 
discussing the matter with Mr. Kelly, he 
obtained an affidavit tmich has been 
filed with the court in the above matter. 
The affidavit reads as follows: 
"County of Salt Lake) 
• ss 
State of Utah ) 
Comew now, DANIEL 
KELLY, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
That I, DANIEL KELLY, 
of my O'{,o70 free will and so that the 
whole truth shall be made known to 
all concerned, do hereby certify in 
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this affidavit that the testomony 
I heretofore gave on my sworn oath 
to tell the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth in and 
at the trial of DENNIS KINDER, the 
said DEm~IS KINDER then and there 
being tried in court for the crime 
of robbing the AL HARRIS DAIRY 
located at Salt Lake City, in the 
State of Utah, said trial being 
had on the 13th day of June, 1962, 
v1as erroneous in that I, DANIEL 
IffiLLY, did mistakenly identify 
DENNIS KINDER as the person 't\lho 
robbed me at the time of the said 
robbery and I have since found 
out to my ot-7n satisfaction that 
Dffi~NIS KINDER, who was convicted 
of robbing me, was not the person 
who did rob me and of the fact 
DENNIS KINDER did not rob me I 
am now certain and, to this fact 
I do now swear without fear of 
perjuring myself; and, further: 
in regards to my previous trial 
testimony identifying DENNIS 
KINDER as being the person who 
robbed me, I then so testified 
that he could have been the 
person but I did not testify that 
he was the person and that he did 
not rob me I now know beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and, therefore, 
this affidavit is made to clear 
DENNIS KINDER of any connection 
Whatsoever with the crime for 
which he· was charged, tried and 
convicted; and, wherefore, I, 
DANIEL KELLY, now state that I 
am only sorry that I was forced 
to testify at DENNIS KINDER'S 
trial, but I had no choice under 
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the circwnstances I found myself 
facing at that particular time. 
lsi Daniel Kelly 
DA1f:fEL-KE"LtY--J[friat1f 
' 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
this 24th day of August, 1962. 
60{J{mruBi~~-h~'?_OE._ 
Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah 
:My Cornmission E}'pires: 
September 20, 1S'63" 
Toe defendant also obtained an affi-
davit from Charles Glenis Anderson) 
another prisoner, and this affidavit 
has also been filed with the court. It 
reads as follows: 
"County of Salt Lake) 
. ss 
State of Utah ) 
Comes no'tv, CHARLES 
GLENIS ANDERSON, being first duly 
sworn, deposes and says: 
That I , CHARLES 
GLENIS ANDERSON, of my own free 
will and so that the vmole truth 
shall be made kno't,m to all con-
cerned, do hereby certify in this 
affidavit that DANIEL L. KELLY 
did personally and voluntarily 
admit to me and tell me that DE~miS 
KINDER w·as innocent of the robbery 
of the L'1L I-:rt~RRIS HILK DEPOT located 
-7-
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in Salt Lake City, in the State 
of Utah, and that he, DANIEL I<ELLY, 
w~s ~lid to testif¥ at the ~trial 
of Dii:NNlS K:r'NDER by some person 
or persons not made known to me, 
and further, DANIEL L. KELLY did 
state to me that the aforesaid 
person or persons who had paid 
him to so testify was or were 
guilty of robbing the AL HARRIS 
MILK DEPOT and not DENNIS KINDER. 
Ls/ Charles G. Anderson 
CH.ARLlt'S"GLENISANDERSON 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
this 24th day of August, 1962. 
Ls/ James. irJ. Johnson 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
September 20, 1963" 
From past Utah Supreme Court decisions 
it appears that both of the following 
requirements must be met before newly 
discovered evidence can be grounds for a 
new trial: 
1. The evidence could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
-8-
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77-38-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
State vs. ~-Jeaver, 78 U. 515, 6 P.2d 
167. 
State vs. MaDre, 41 U. 247, 126 P. 
322. 
State vs. Ha~Jkins, 81 U. 16, 16 
P.2d 13. 
State vs. Uilliams, l:.9 U. 336, 
16L:. P. 253. 
2. Tne evidence must be of such a 
character or import as to justify a con-
elusion that upon a ne~·:r trial the jury 
vJou1d bring a verdict which is different 
from the one thnt was rendered at the 
first trial. 
State vs. £i!on t gomery, 37 u. 515, 
193 P. 815. 
State vs. Sirmay, 40 u. 525, 122 
P. 748. 
State vs. \t.Jeaver, 78 u. 515, 6 P.2d 
167. 
State vs. Cooper, llL} u. 531, 201 
p .2d 764-. 
State vs. Hawkins, 81 u. 16, 16 P.2d 
13. 
It is obvious f~com the circumstances 
under ~.vhich tbe affidavits were obtained 
that they were unavailable until after 
the trial of the case. After his convic-
tion, the defendant was committed to the 
-9-
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Utah State Prison for punishment. vfuen he 
arrived there, he found that Mr. Daniel 
Kelly, the robbery victim and identifying 
witness for the prosecution, had been 
returned to the prison for parole viola-
tion bet'tveen the time of the robbery and 
the time of the trial. The defendant 
did not become acquainted with the other 
\vitness, C:'.1arles Gle.nis Anderson, until 
he arrived at the prison. Therefore, the 
evidence brought forth in this case was 
not available to the defendant until after 
the trial and satisfies the first require-
ment listed above. 
In regards to the second requirement, 
the content of both affidavits tend to 
change, discredit and repudiate the most 
important testimony at the trial--the 
identification of the defendant as the 
perpetrator of the crime. The testimony 
of Daniel Kelly (transcript, page 14, 
-10-
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lines 7, 8) indicates that he and the 
robber ~·1ere a lone in the store at the 
time that the robbery took place. There 
were no other witnesses to the occurrence 
and the State's case was based almost 
entirely on the identification of the 
defendant by Mr. Kelly. Any change in 
that testimony in a subsequent trial of 
this case would certainly lead to an 
opposite verdict by the jury. In fact, 
without such identification, it appears 
that the court would dismiss the case 
after the State had presented its 
evidence. 
·The Supreme Court of Utah has con-
sidered at least two previous cases in 
~mich the principal witnesses to the 
identity of the defendant have stated in 
affidavits that they v7ere mistaken in the 
identity of the accused and that they~ 
w·ere convinced that another person was 
guilty of the crime charged. 
-11-
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See State vs. Edmunds, 27 U. 1, 73 P. 
886, and State vs. King, 27 u. 6, 73 P. 
1045. In both of these cases, the appel-
lant court reversed the decisions of the 
trial court for its failure to ~rant a 
new trial. By these cases the court has 
declared that where the witness admits 
that he 't•Jas mistaken and that the identi-
fication was wrongful, then a new trial 
should be granted. The discove~J of 
new evidence in our caoe makes it nee-
essary for the court to set aside the 
verdict of the jury and to grant a net·7 
trial in this matter. 
Point 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
PERf1ITTING 'IHE PROSECUTION TO CROSS-EX.AHINE 
THE DEFENDANT REGARDING I:-1ATTERS HHICH t~lERE 
NOT BROUG'dT OUT ON DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
The evidence brought out by the 
prosecution on cross-examination was 
improper for t~vo reasons: 
1. It was irrelevant because it 
tended to sholv evidence that the defendant 
-12-
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had stolen the truck in Which he 
had driven to Arizona. This was 
a crime for which he had not been 
charged and for ~mich he was not 
being tried. 
2. The questions posed by the 
prooecut~r were outside the sco~e 
of proper cross-examination and 
should have been excluded by the 
court. 
As a preliminary to the dis-
cussion of these two allegations 
it should be pointed out that the 
testimony of the defendant on direct 
examination was carefully limited 
to the facts and circumstances Which 
established hisWhereabouts at the 
time the robbery occurred. They. 
refer exclusively to his alibi. 
On cross-examination the prosecutor 
was allowed to cross-examine the 
-13-
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defendant about a 1955 Ford pick-
up truck which he drove to Arizona. 
He was subsequently allowed to 
question him about Where he 
acquired the truck (page 40, lines 
16-27), the colors of the truck 
(page 46, line 23 to Page 47, line 
9), how he painted the truck (page 
47, lines 10-30) and about an un-
related conversation with.a police-
man about the truck (page 50, 
lines 11-17). On rebuttal, the 
court permitted the prosecutor to 
call as a witness a police officer 
to contradict the defendant's test-
imony and to testify about a con-
versation ~roich he had with the 
defendant regarding where he had 
acquired the truck (page 60, line 
3 to page 62, line 3) and how he 
had painted the vehicle (page 62, 
lines 1-6). 
-14-
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Now let us turn our attention 
to the question of Whether or Dot 
the evidence Which the prosecutor 
brought out on cross-examination 
was relevant to the issues. 
When one reads the testimony of 
officer Donald Lyman (pages 59-63) 
regarding his interrogation of the 
defendant about the 1955 Ford pick-
up truck, it becomes obvious that 
the truck was stolen by the ac-
cused a day or two before the 
robbe~J. This must have been 
even more obvious to the jury at 
the trial. This was a direct 
(successful) attempt on the part 
of the prosecution to bring in evi-
dence to show that the defendant 
had committed another crime--that 
of stealing an automobile--prior 
to and apart from the crime for 
Which he was being charged. In 
-15-
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allowing the prosecution to bring 
~uch evidence to the attention of 
the jury, the judge comrni t ted 
prejudicial error. A summary of 
the law in this field is set forth 
in 1 Jones on Evidence 290, 5th 
Edition, 1958, Section 162 on 
Relevancy. The text thereof is 
as follo'tt7S: 
"CRllviES OTHER THAN OFFENSE 
CHARGES.--Peculiarly appli-
cable to criminal cases is 
the rule tvhich prohibits 
the introduction of evidence 
of other wholly independent 
offenses as the basis for 
an inference that the defend-
ant is guilty of the offense 
for which he is being tried. 
Otherwise stated, it is not 
proper to show by proof of 
previous bad conduct that 
he has a propensity for com-
mitting crime, and because 
he committed other crimes on 
previous occasions he probably 
committed the crime in 
question." 
"Although it has been 
treated as a rule of relevancy, 
and is here so classified, 
the rule is recognized, not 
because the evidence of 
previous offenses is irrele-
-16-
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vant, but for other more 
plausible reasons. One 
basic reason for the rule 
is that such evidence is 
apt to be given too much 
weight, rather than too 
little, by the jury, thus 
resulting in the con-
viction of a defendant 
because he is a bad man 
and not because of his 
specific guilt of the 
offense with which he is 
charged." 
"It is a sound rule of 
public policy and therefore 
exclusionary in the sense 
that it keeps out relevant 
evidence for justifiable 
reasons. Besides the 
highly prejudicial character 
of such evidence there are 
the considerations that a 
defendant is entitled to 
be tried only for the crime 
charged against him, that 
he is entitled to notice 
and the right to prepare 
his defense to any charges 
brought against him free 
from surprise, that the 
evidence of collateral 
crimes would tend to con-
fuse the jury and divert 
them from the real issues, 
that bad character cannot 
be proved by evidence of 
specific acts, and that the 
state is not entitled to 
attack the character of the 
accused until he has offered 
evidence of his good character." 
-17-
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The Utah Supreme Court has 
followed this view. The rule set 
forth by the cases is that evi-
dence of other crimes is not 
admissible unless such evidence 
has probative value towards 
proving a material issue. See 
State vs. Torgerson, 4 U.2d 52, 
286 P.2d 800. 
In a concurring opinion 
written by Justice Lester A. Wade 
in the case of State vs. Winget, 
6 U.2d 243, 310 P.2d 738, there 
appears a very comprehensive and 
instructive outline of the laws 
of the State of Utah in regards to 
the question of relevancy. It is 
stated as follows: 
"The following is a brief 
review of the rules above 
referred to: Except tmere 
otherwise provided by Rules 
of Evidence all relevant 
evidence is admissible. 
-18-
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Relevant evidence means evi-
dence having a tendency in 
reason to p~ove or disprove 
any material facts in issue. 
However, evidence that a 
person committed a crime 
upon one occasion is inad-
missible to prove his dis-
position, bad character, 
or propensity to commit 
crime as the basis for an 
inference that he commit-
ted the crime for which he 
is on trial, but such evi-
dence v1hen relevant is 
admissible to prove some 
other material facts includ-
ing the absence of mistake 
or accident, motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge or identity. 
The reason for e:>ccluding 
such evidence is that the 
danger of prejudice out-
weighs the probative value 
of such evidence. This is 
said to be an application 
of the rule against the 
initial introduction of 
evidence of bad character 
by the prosecution. How-
ever, it is generally 
recognized that the judge 
may in his discretion ex-
clude such evidence if he 
finds that its probative 
value is substantially 
outweighed by the risk that 
the admission will cause 
undue consumption of time, 
create substantial danger 
of undue prejudice or of 
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confusing the issues or 
misleading the jury or 
unfairly and harmfully 
surprise the defendant 
who has not had reason-
able opportunity to 
anticipate that such 
evidence would be offered." 
An earlier Utah case Which 
follows this doctrine is State vs. 
Williams, 36 U 273, 103 P 250. In 
that case the court reversed the 
verdict of the jury and stated 
that the evidence allo~"Jed by the 
judge was absolutely inadmissible. 
The court explained that where a 
defendant is on trial for a part-
icular crime, evidence that he on 
some other occasion had committed 
a separate and distinct crime 
wholly disconnected from the crime 
charged in the indictment is never 
admissible unless there is some 
logical connection between the two 
from Which it can be said that 
-20-
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proof of one tends to establish 
the. other. 
In summary on this point, 
'tt.Te \~auld 1 ike to quote from the 
case of State vs. Dixon, 12 U.2d 
8, 361 P.2d l~l2. This is the 
last case to be decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court on this 
question. In this case the 
court said: 
"It is the sound and 
salutary policy of 
the law to indulge 
everyone, including in 
convicted felons, with 
the presumption of 
inoocence, and to require 
the State to obtain and 
present sufficient and 
creditible evidence to 
convince the. jury of the 
defendant's g.uil t of the 
crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If 
this were not so, serious 
and perhaps insuperable 
obstacles to reformation 
and rehabilitation would 
exist for a man who once 
acquired a bad reputation." 
In allowing the prosecution 
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to bring in evidence Which tended 
to establish that the defendant 
had committed another crime which 
was separate and apart from the 
crime charged in the information, 
the trial court committed prejud-
icial error and the verdict of the 
jury should be set aside and the 
case remanded to the District 
Court for a ne~v trial. 
Now let us consider the 
allegation that the questions 
posed by the prosecutor were 
outside the scope of proper 
cross-examination. This allega-
tion involves the same or similar 
evidence as that referred to in 
allegation number l. 
In Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
77-44-2, we find the following: 
"RULES OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL 
APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL 
CASES--EXCEPTIONS. --The 
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rules of evidence in civil 
actions shall be applicable 
also to criminal actions, 
except as otherwise provided 
in this Code." 
In Section 77-44-5, the Utah 
law further states as follows: 
''ilROS.J-EXAMINATrON OF 
DEFEND~NT--FAILURE TO 
TESTIFY NOT TO PREJUDICE.--
If a defendant offers him-
self as a witness, he may be 
cross-examined by the counsel 
for the state the same as 
any other witness-.~"His~ 
neglecl-or ··refusal to be a 
witness shall not in any 
manner prejudice him or be 
used against him on the 
trial or proceeding." 
In the case of State vs. 
N u r ph y , 9 2 U. 3 8 2 , 6 8 P • 2d 181 , the 
Utah court stated the law regarding 
the scope of cross-examination of 
witnesses as follows: 
"Under this section, ( 77-l}4--
2) the acope of cross-examin-
ation of witnesses in 
criminal actions would be 
governed by the same rules 
as apply in civil actions.tt 
Under Rule 43(b) of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure, the wit-
ness may be cross-examined by the 
adversary party only upon the 
subject matter of his examination 
in chief. However, this principle 
of law was not inaugurated with the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This practice was followed by many 
cases prior to the adoption of 
these rules. See the following 
cases: 
State vs. Johnson, 76 U. 
Bl:., 287 P.. 9 09 • 
State vs. Williams, 36 U. 
273, 103 P. 250. 
State vs. Vance, 38 U. 1, 
110 p •. 434. 
State vs. Thorne, 39 U.208, 
117 P. 58. 
The aforementioned ca.se of 
State vs. Vance deserves particu-
lar attention by the court because 
the issue tvas similar to the one 
in the instant case~ In that 
matter the defendant was charged 
-24-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and convicted of murdering his wife 
by be.a ting and poi.soning. The 
court reversed the verdict of the 
jury because it held that any 
cross-examination of the defendant 
about the beating was held im-
proper 'men the defendant denied 
that he had poisoned his wife. 
The court said: 
"But -vmere, as in the case 
at bar, the witness li~its 
his statements to ne~ativ­
ing or explaining me~e 
issolated facts, or merely 
states -vmat occurred at a 
particular time and place, 
then vJha t took place at 
such time and place ordin-
arily constitutes the sub-
ject matter upon ~vhich the 
witness testified, and the 
cross-examination should be 
limited to that subject." 
In the case of State vs. 
Bleazard, 103 U. 113, 133 P.2d 
1000, which was decided in 19t:.3, 
the court again said that cross-
examination is limited in scope 
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by matters brought out on direct 
examination and the like. 
In an early civil case, the 
court seems to expound the same 
doctrine. The following state-
ment is tound in the case of 
Jensen vs. S. H. Kress & Company, 
87 U. 434, 49 P.2d 958, which 
was decided in 1935. 
"Cr.oss-examination is the 
detective of the court-
room •• It may be used to 
examine as to the credi-
bility of the witness as 
a vehicle for transmitting 
the testimony, granted it 
is not too remote or the 
law of diminishing return 
from such cross-examination 
has not set in. But in 
every case it must either 
tend to modify, contradict, 
explain, deny or elaborate 
testimony of the "I"Jitness in 
chief, or something which 
has been previously brought 
out on corss-examination, 
which itself was proper 
cross-exarnina t ion." 
The above cases and many others are 
carefully discussed and the Utah 
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rule on cross-examination is 
adequately stated in an excellent 
article by Ronan E. Degnan which 
is entitled "Non-Rules Evidence 
Lav.J: Cross-Examination." This 
article is found in 6 Utah La-;.;1 
Revic't=l 323. 
Since the adoption of the 
new ru.l:.es of evidence., the law 
has been crystalized in this 
field. It is clear that the 
cross-exa~iner, even in criminal 
cases, cannot go beyond the 
subject matter testified to on 
direct. In a broader sense, the 
cross-examiner may bring out any-
thing whicb tends to modify, con-
~ .¥ 
tradict,· ~xplain, deny or elaborate 
the testimony of the witness in 
chief. In the case now before the 
court, the evidence as to where the 
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defendant had obtained the pick-up 
truck in \11hich he drove to Arizona 
does not fall into any of these 
catagories. It is obvious that 
this te.s t imony 'ttJas nevJ, differ-
ent and apart from that brought 
out on direct examination. This 
was very damaging to the defend-
ant's case. TI1e only possible 
explanation for such evidence 
could be that the prosecution 
lllas trying to impeach or dis-
credit the witness. Even under 
that theory, the testimony was 
too extensive and the questions 
too broad. In 98 C. J. S. 351, 
Section l.~7L:. on ::.-!itnesses, the la'\iv 
on impeachment is stated as follows: 
"TO II.JPEACH OR DISCREDIT 
\~~JITNESS-1\ party has the 
right to introduce evi-
dence directly attacking 
the credibility of the 
witness for his adversary; 
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~_>..t ordinarily a vJitness 
~y;· bot be impeached on 
collateral matters not 
relevant to the issues 
to be tried." 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant should be 
granted a new trial for two 
reasons. First, since the trial 
of the case the defendant has 
discovered new e~taence which is 
material to his case. Second, 
the evidence that was presented 
by prosecution to the jury on 
cross-examination of the defend-
antand through his rebuttal 
witness 'ljJas improper and prejud-
icial. 
i.lE,S PECTFULLY SUBr11 TTED, 
BARTON /~ND ICLEi:M 
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